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KEY COMMODITIES: 
Fish, deepwater ports1
TOTAL NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS  
(AS % OF GDP) (2015): 
0.0 per cent2
NATIONAL EXTRACTIVES COMPANY: 
N/A. However, Temasek Holdings, a holding 
company with the Singapore Minister for Finance 
as its sole shareholder, has shares in Repsol, S.A., 
Turquoise Hill Resources Ltd., and Pavilion Energy 
Pte Ltd.
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE (2016): 
0.925 (Global Rank 38)3
1 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2017). The world factbook. Washington, DC: CIA. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2111.html
2 World Bank Group. (2017). Total natural resource rents (% of GDP). Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
TOTL.RT.ZS
3 United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Human Development Reports: Singapore. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/
en/countries/profiles/SGP
Singapore’s development since the 1960s has 
relied heavily on an export-led economic strategy 
supported by dedicated institutions providing 
guidance, fiscal incentives and a thriving financial 
and logistics sector. With little reserves of 
crude oil, the country has leveraged its unique 
geographical position as the gateway to Asian 
markets with world-class port infrastructure. 
It has attracted a number of large-scale oil 
refineries and petrochemical industries clustered 
in an export processing zone, making it the 
petroleum trading hub of the region.
Building on Royal Dutch Shell’s initiative to set up 
a refinery to exploit the Asian market and taking 
advantage of its port facilities and strategic 
location in the Asia-Pacific region, the government 
2implemented an export-driven industrial policy 
centred around refined oil products. The success 
over the years has been sustained thanks to the 
strong fuel consumption trends in rapidly growing 
Asian economies. Recognizing a shift in the 
region’s product demand trends, the government 
has moved further downstream by developing the 
petrochemicals sector. 
To implement its vision, the 
government has adopted a 
twin-track industrial strategy 
of keeping bureaucratic 
regulations to a minimum while 
building supportive dedicated 
institutions to attract, steward 
and support investments. This 
was coupled with generous 
fiscal and financial incentives. 
The industrial strategy also 
leveraged the power of 
industrial agglomeration 
with the Jurong Island Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ), which has attracted companies along the 
value chain, including in refining, storage and 
shipping. A thriving financial and service sector 
supports these activities. The model has allowed 
the industry in Singapore to differentiate itself 
from other emerging players in Asia by helping 
firms achieve operational efficiencies and cost 
reductions. Over time, oil trading has become a 
major sector in the country, granting Singapore its 
primacy as Asia’s oil trading hub.
THE PILLARS OF A SUCCESSFUL 
DOWNSTREAM POLICY
Singapore’s success in attracting the downstream 
value chain of oil has its roots in the late 19th 
century, when the British Empire built three bulk 
storage tanks for kerosene on Bukom Island 
(belonging to the Singapore archipelago) for 
storing oil and supplying British operations in 
East Asia. They also invested in Singapore’s port 
infrastructure and regional connectivity. 
4 Rodan, G. (1989). The political economy of Singapore’s industrialization: National state and international capital. International Political Economy 
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After independence from the British regime, in 
1961 Singapore established a dedicated institution 
to promote industrial development and attract 
investment. The so-called Economic Development 
Board (EDB) was endowed with a budget of USD 
100 million to design and implement policies 
to promote industrial investments in Singapore, 
foster enterprise opportunities in international 
markets and offer development financing options. 
The 1965 separation from the Federation of 
Malaysia, which for its part was pursuing import 
substitution strategies, empowered the EDB. It 
became the engine of Singapore’s economic 
growth through an export-oriented industrial 
strategy. At the core of this strategy was the 
desire to build on the strategic comparative 
advantage in the oil industry built by the British 
Empire and to leverage Singapore’s strategic port 
between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.  
In this context, the 1960s and 1970s saw the 
establishment of further supportive institutions 
to the oil-based export industry as well as the 
deployment of a fiscal incentive policy:
• In 1968, the EDB created the Development 
Bank of Singapore (DBS) to oversee capital 
financing for export-oriented industries 
(EOI), and the International Trading Company 
(Intraco) with the mission “to develop 
overseas markets for Singapore-made 
products and to source cheaper raw materials 
for local industries through bulk buying.”4  
The government has adopted a twin-
track industrial strategy of keeping 
bureaucratic regulations to a minimum 
while building supportive dedicated 
institutions to attract investments.
3• Investment incentives included allowing 
companies to operate tax-free for the first 
five years of operation, removing import 
duties on equipment and raw materials 
needed as inputs, and reducing the 
corporate income tax rate to 4 per cent on 
export manufacturing companies.
• Investment attraction policies also relied 
on quick approval/licensing processes 
for private investment and large-scale 
government investments in advanced 
logistics infrastructure. 
The deployment of export promotion strategies 
built on the auspicious context of the time: the 
refinery sector was attracted by fuel demand 
increase in Asia and lack of competing refineries 
in the region. Oil refining was cited as Singapore’s 
“dominant growth industry between 1965 and 1969” 
as the island nation steadily rose to become the 
Asia-Pacific’s leading port economy.5 Singapore 
enjoyed a first-mover advantage to cater to the 
Asia-Pacific’s fuel and specialty chemical needs.6  
The first foreign company to invest was British-
Dutch oil major Shell in the 1960s. It built a 
20,000 barrel per day (bpd) refinery to service the 
Southeast Asian markets. Other oil companies 
followed, using and developing storage facilities in 
Singapore. Investments in refineries boomed during 
the years of soaring fuel demand coming from 
the American military’s involvement in Vietnam. 
Singapore was a close partner of the United States, 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ng, W.H. (2013). Singapore, the energy economy: From the first refinery to the end of cheap Oil, 1960–2010. Routledge.
7 Ibid.
8 Meanwhile, neighbouring countries were experiencing mass conflict and political instability: Vietnam slipped into war in the late 1960s, Thailand’s 
farming class led a revolution in 1970, and Indonesia was beset by a Communist purge in 1965.
9 Sharma, S., & Fesharaki, F. (Eds.). (1991). Energy market and policies in ASEAN. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
with the People’s Action Party-led government 
having a strong anti-communist stance.7
Building on this momentum, the EDB continued 
offering fiscal incentives for the industries that 
it granted “pioneer” status, which included the 
oil refining sector. Complete corporate income 
tax exemptions in some cases were extended 
to 10 years or longer. These incentives, coupled 
with perceived political stability compared to 
its neighbours, helped strengthen Singapore’s 
investment attractiveness in the 1970s.8
To benefit from the thriving 
sector, the government created 
the Singapore National Oil 
Corporation (SNOC) in 1980, 
which was responsible for 
managing energy resources 
and infrastructure, as well as 
stimulating economic growth in 
the oil downstream sector.9
USING THE “CLUSTER 
APPROACH” TO FURTHER 
DEEPEN DOWNSTREAM 
LINKAGES
In the 1980s, prompted by the realization that 
the oil business was volatile (after the two oil 
shocks), Singapore decided to move down the 
value chain and focus its efforts on developing 
the petrochemicals industry. At the core of this 
undertaking was the establishment of the Jurong 
Economic Zone on the Jurong Islands in 1983. This 
was partly motivated by the industrial land scarcity 
on the mainland. The Zone benefited from large 
infrastructure investments by the EDB. A roadway 
network was built connecting the seven islands. 
In a few years Jurong became the heart of the 
petrochemical industry, with companies clustering 
in the area. The industry benefited from being close 
Complete corporate income tax 
exemptions in some cases were 
extended to 10 years or longer.
4to feedstock from the refineries and having access 
to storage (Singapore has the largest bunkering 
port in the world, selling 48.6 million tonnes of 
bunker fuel) and world markets through the most 
advanced port in the region. In addition, businesses 
on Jurong benefited from service providers being 
located in close proximity. This cluster of inputs, 
services and expertise attracted companies like 
Shell and ExxonMobil to use Singapore port as a 
stockpiling centre and logistics hub.
The fierce competition within the Jurong cluster 
model reduced operational costs and increased 
efficiency of the sector. By 1995, Singapore’s 
petrochemicals trade was valued at USD 11.7 billion 
and its export earnings reached USD 5 billion.  In 
2001, ExxonMobil invested USD 
2 billion in a petrochemicals 
plant, and in 2006, Shell built a 
large petrochemicals complex 
boasting an 800,000 tonne per 
year (t/y) ethylene cracker on 
Bukom Island and a 750,000  
t/y mono-ethylene glycol plant  
on Jurong. 
The presence of these 
large-scale refining and 
petrochemical complexes 
attracted further industries. Companies such as 
Vopak, Hin Leong and Oiltanking that specialize 
in leasing out storage capacity settled in 
Singapore. The biggest oil trading firms, including 
Vitol, Glencore and Trafigura have their regional 
offices there. Singapore’s dominant position as 
a trading hub in the region is best illustrated by 
Platts setting the “free on board” shipping price 
benchmark for refined oil products in Singapore.10 
GROWING CHALLENGES IN THE 
REFINERY SECTOR  
The booming demand from East Asia’s economic 
development has sustained Singapore’s refining 
industry. To keep up, Singapore has specialized 
10 Ramaswamy, E. (2007). Singapore’s role as a key oil trading centre in Asia. Energy perspectives on Singapore and the region (pp. 31-41). Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
11 Jaipuriyar, M. Mohanty, S. (2017). Analysis: Singapore can’t afford to let oil exports lose edge despite carbon tax. S&P Global Platts. Retrieved from 
https://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/singapore/analysis-singapore-cant-afford-to-let-oil-exports-27775455
in importing large volumes of crude from the 
Middle East, storing, blending and exporting 
liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel 
and a variety of other petro-products. However, 
Singapore’s dominant market position in Asia is 
being challenged by a few factors:
• Competition: International oil companies 
(IOCs) are looking to establish and upgrade 
refineries in neighbouring countries as 
regional competition to host these industries 
has increased. Neighbouring countries seek 
to attract IOCs with lower labour costs and 
larger incentives. Even in terms of storage, 
the Philippines, China, India and Thailand are 
becoming more attractive destinations.
• Environmental concerns: Growing social 
and political concerns about the negative 
environmental externalities from refineries 
and petrochemical plants have resulted 
in the scrapping of expansion plans. In 
accordance with Singapore’s 2020 plan, 
the government is planning to introduce 
a carbon tax that could make refining a 
costlier activity.11 
• Lack of space: The island is facing 
constraints of land availability, and there 
is limited room for expansion. The scarcity 
of storage space has resulted in increasing 
storage costs and longer turnaround times. 
Traders are therefore looking at alternatives, 
including China, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
Singapore has specialized in importing 
large volumes of crude from the Middle 
East, storing, blending and exporting a 
variety of petro-products.
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As a result of a combination of these challenges 
and a worldwide trend, the refined petroleum 
industry has suffered production losses in 
recent years. Its output slumped from USD 
57.2 billion in 2012 to USD 32.9 billion in 2015.12 
To address these challenges, the government 
initiated “Jurong Island Version 2.0” to further 
improve the special economic zone (SEZ) and 
boost investor confidence. In 2014, Jurong 
invested USD 950 million in increasing its storage 
capacity. Due to land constraints, the storage 
was built underground in rock caverns that can 
hold up to 147 million cubic metres of liquid 
hydrocarbons. Business responded positively with 
more companies investing in the SEZ. In 2015 
the Jurong Island SEZ was home to over 100 
petrochemical companies with an estimated USD 
34 billion worth of investment. By January 2017 
the petrochemical sector recorded a 37 per cent 
export growth rate.13 
12 Department of Statistics Singapore. (2017). Yearbook of statistics Singapore, 2016. Department of Statistics, Ministry of Trade & Industry, Republic 
of Singapore.
13 Suratman, N. (2017). Singapore January petrochemical exports grow 37.1 percent on year. ICIS News. Retrieved from https://www.icis.com/resources/
news/2017/02/17/10079939/singapore-january-petrochemical-exports-grow-37-1-on-year/
KEY LESSONS
• Political will backed by institutions and 
policy cohesion is key to developing 
downstream industries.
• Access to the raw resources is not essential 
to build downstream industries.
• In the right environment there are 
opportunities to move further down the 
value chain (in this case from refineries to 
the petrochemical sector).
• The evolution of Singapore toward further 
downstream value-addition (from the 
refinery to the petrochemical sector) reveals 
the government’s capacity to adapt to 
changing market conditions.
• This evolution toward further beneficiation 
has been enabled by Singapore’s 
comparative advantage (geographical 
position and port) and the government’s 
proactive and visionary decision to create 
the supportive business and infrastructure 
environment (i.e., Jurong island).
